Continuing from part I
Ibn Taymiyya’s objection to Imām al-Ghazali’s statement that logic is the basis for all sciences
Ibn Taymiyya objected to Imām al-Ghazali’s statement that logic is the basis of all sciences. Ibn Taymiyya claimed that this statement is known to be false both rationally and legally…here we shall analyze his own logical and legal inference establishing this, and then we shall critique it:
A. Ibn Taymiyya’s logical inference proving the incorrectness of al-Ghazali’s words
The sum of this inference is his claim that all of the people of intellect have formulated their sciences without Greek logic. This—if correct—implies that there is no real need for logic. This claim is a gross error for the following reasons:
- Aristotle was from the people of intellect and he formulated his sciences based upon the logic that he developed.
- Ibn Taymiyya himself admitted in his own books that many of the theologians were influenced by Greek logic and that they formulated the contents of their books based upon it, such as: al-Abhuri, al-Razi, al-Katibi, al-Amidi, and others. If that was not the case, then why did Ibn Taymiyya expend so much effort in refuting the science of logic, and why did he expend so much in explaining the errors that one may fall into if he relies upon it? If there was no one who formulated their science based upon logic then what motivated all the refutations?
- It is known that many of the philosophers such as Ibn Sina, al-Farābi, and Ibn Mulk formulated their sciences and philosophies based upon logic.
- Ibn Taymiyya claimed that some people said that all of logic is true. If his citation is in fact true, then it establishes that they relied upon logic in formulating the contents of their books
If Ibn Taymiyya meant that the people of intellect did not study the exact same books of logic authored by the Greeks, and that despite this, they were able to formulate their sciences, then it should be known that we do not intend those exact same books…we are only speaking about the principles of logic; be they mentioned in the books or not. It is known that the Muslims wrote a large collection of books on logic and it is known by necessity that a huge number of people have relied upon these books in learning the sciences. We do not need— and nor was it needed in Ibn Taymiyya’s time for that matter—to read the exact same books of the Greeks in order to become acquainted with the principles of logic. We are able to suffice ourselves with perusing and reading the books formulated by the scholars of the Muslims on that topic. For this reason, we are able to debate and critique the sciences of others based upon the same principles of logic without needing to refer back to the ancient works of the Greeks.
If Ibn Taymiyya meant that all of the people of intellect were free of needing the principles of logic mentioned by the scholars in their books, and that along with this, they were able to formulate their sciences, then this is false by necessity. The falsehood of this can be proven by referring back to Ibn Taymiyya’s own words in which he said that some of what is contained in the book of logic is completely correct.
B. Ibn Taymiyya’s legal inference supporting his stance: claiming that learning the science of logic was not commanded by Allah, the Exalted
This itself is a type of fallacious reasoning that Ibn Taymiyya would have been unable to write, were it not that he relied upon the modes of fallacious reasoning mentioned and warned against by the logicians. To clarify this:
- If Ibn Taymiyya intended that Allah did not textually state that it is obligatory to learn Greek logic, and because of this, it is therefore unlawful and learning it is false because there is no Divine text to support it, then this is completely false because it is well known that the point of contention is not in reading the actual works of the Greeks, rather it is in the benefit found in the principles mentioned in the books of logic—be they found in the words of the Greeks or other than them. It is not permissible to declare something unlawful or impermissible merely because there is no explicit Divine text stating that it is obligatory and naming it by its name and particular. Its legality may be inferred from the generality of evidence or an analogy between it and something similar to it; it is not necessary that there be an explicit detailed text for it.
- If Ibn Taymiyya was of the belief that it is not obligatory or allowed to learn something unless there is an explicit Divine text stating so and calling it by its name, then this is also completely false. Such a belief entails cancellation of the commands of the Sacred Law and its generalities as well as an invalidation of analogy. The sum of Ibn Taymiyya’s inference here is [as if he is saying]: ‘I do not believe in the legality of learning Greek logic unless there is an explicit text in the Islamic Sacred Law saying: ‘Learning Greek logic is allowed’. Since there is no such text in the Sacred Law, learning Greek logic is not allowed.’ This is false because it is known that focus is placed not upon the name ‘logic’ or that it is attributed to the Greeks or others, rather focus is placed on whether or not these principles mentioned in the books of logic benefit knowledge or not.
- Ibn Taymiyya’s words are fallacious because he said: “Allah did not obligate learning this Greek logic…” In other words, his view was that since the Sacred Law did not command the learning of Greek logic, then it follows that it did not command the learning of logic at all. This is a clear fallacy. Not a single scholar claimed that in the Sacred Law, learning logic is commanded because it is Greek logic. Anyone who makes such a claim is a liar and fabricator against the Sacred Law. I know of no one who has claimed this, and the fact that Ibn Taymiyya negates this makes it seem as if there are some who actually believe that.
- If Ibn Taymiyya agrees with us—at the very least—that some of the principles mentioned in logic are sound and lead to sound knowledge, then it is not permissible for him to oppose us in saying that learning its principles are—at the very least—allowed. For him to oppose this is to oppose the Sacred Law itself. The apparent meaning of his words indicates that he believes that there is nothing correct in the science of logic that is commanded in the Sacred Law.
PART THREE: Logic; some of it is sound and some of it is false
